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The Supreme Court has been busy deciding one particular Indian law case
that may have far-reaching negative repercussions. That case, El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,' is very troubling due to the fact that it weakens the
exhaustion doctrine, and by extension tribal sovereignty. Formulated in
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,2 the
exhaustion doctrine requires non-Indian parties in civil actions involving tribes
or tribal lands to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to bringing an action in
a federal court. This simple imprimatur has enhanced the extent and power
of the tribal court system in a way that few rulings have. Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante further expanded the scope of the exhaustion
doctrine, holding that once a case had proceeded through the tribal court
system including its appellate review, the federal district court would review
the propriety of tribal jurisdiction. The federal court could only address the
merits of the case should it find that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction.
The issue of whether a statutory prohibition of tribal jurisdiction would be
recognized was affirmatively answered in Blue Legs v. United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs.4 Citing Iowa Mutual, the Eighth Circuit stated, "[c]ivil
jurisdiction over such activities [of non-Indians on reservation land lies] in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provigion or
federal statute."' When a statute designates federal courts as the appropriate
forum for adjudicating a matter without making specific reference to tribal
court jurisdiction has been somewhat controversial. Most courts, however,
have followed a strict textual statutory analysis and have held that absent
specific mention of tribal court in a statute, the requirement to exhaust tribal
court remedies is applicable in that instance. Leading cases promoting this
analysis are Kerr McGee Corp. v. Farley6 and El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Neztsosie2 That was until Neztsosie was granted certiorari and argued before
*Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 526 U.S. 473 (1999). Neztsosie involves various personal injury and wrongful death
claims against a uranium mining corporation including claims brought under the Price-Anderson
Act.
2. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
3. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
4. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
5. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14.
6. 915 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.M. 1995).
7. 136 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the Supreme Court in the spring of 1999. In Neztsosie the Court critically
limited the exhaustion doctrine by broadening its textual analysis of statutory
language and holding that when Congress passes legislation relating to state
courts without mentioning tribal courts, by inference, includes tribal courts
also. The regulation of tort claims related to nuclear industry is a particularly
volatile and significant issue. The court makes a powerful argument that the
complete preemption of all state court litigation evidences a strong desire on
the part of Congress to consolidate these claims.' However, deciding that the
principles of "duplicative determinations"'0 and "consequent inefficiencies""
are adequate principles to allow Congress to draft legislation without the
necessity of giving any conscious thought to the existence of tribal courts is
troubling. One of the greatest battles tribes have fought in the past and
continue to fight is that against invisibility. The need for asserting tribal
recognition occurs on many levels and is a constant struggle for tribes. That
tribes and tribal members continue to be overlooked is plainly evidenced in
the language of this decision when the court states,
Why, then, the congressional silence on tribal courts? . . . We
have not been told of any nuclear testing laboratories or reactors
on reservation lands, and if none was brought to the attention of
Congress either, Congress probably would never have expected an
occasion for asserting tribal jurisdiction over claims like these.
Now and then silence is not pregnant. 2
In the Neztsosie decision, the Court ignored the obvious historical
connections between tribes and the nuclear industry. In addition, the Court
made an assumption that Congress intended tribal courts to be equivalent to
state courts specifically with respect to the Price-Anderson Act 3 claims. The
decision, which essentially undermines tribal authority, is contrary to fact and
precedent on several counts. First, with respect to the jurisdiction of tribes, the
tribal connection with the nuclear industry is well known. Uranium is mined
primarily in the Southwest. One of the largest reservations, the Navajo, is
located in the Southwest. Tribal members have for years been employed in the
uranium mining industry. The mainstream media has publicized tort claims
against employers in this industry by tribal members. One of the most
notorious corporations associated with the nuclear industry, Kerr-McGee





13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (West Supp. 1999) (Atomic Energy Damages Act). The Act
regulates tort litigation arising from nuclear incidents or the nuclear industry. From the smallest
claims to the most catastrophic events, the Act creates a federal civil action and provides for




Corporation, has its corporate headquarters in Oklahoma. Its negligence in the
nuclear industry was popularized in an Academy Award-nominated motion
picture. 4 Based on these general facts alone, any trial court could take
judicial notice of the connection and easily predict that tribal courts would
hear such claims. Certainly members of Congress aided by their staff
members would be aware these facts.
Second, with respect to the presumption of Congress' intent towards tribal
court jurisdiction over Price-Anderson Act claims, it is incumbent upon
Congress to explicitly state that for a fact. While it may have been likely, as
the Court states in Neztsosie, that Congress would have included tribal courts
explicitly when drafting this act, why should the judiciary be allowed to infer
congressional impact. Does such inference, in the face of legislative silence,
not fly in the face of textual statutory analysis? Congress should be required
to acknowledge tribal courts when drafting legislation preempting specific
federal laws from state and tribal court jurisdiction.
Third, with respect to the question of whether tribes as sovereigns are
equivalent to states, the court in Farley was clear in the importance of the
necessity for plain statutory language to abrogate the exhaustion doctrine
when it stated,
Plaintiffs err in assuming that tribes are to be treated as states.
Indian tribes and federal government are dual sovereigns. Tribes
have a unique relationship with the federal government and
occupy a unique status under the law .... It is clearly established
that Indian tribes do not derive their sovereign powers from
congressional delegation. Rather, tribal sovereignty is inherent,
and tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory, to the extent that sovereignty has not been
withdrawn by federal statute or treaty."
Unfortunately, the Court in the Neztsosie case did not agree.
If this decision stands, it deals a heavy blow to the exhaustion doctrine.
The Supreme Court has effectively made tribal courts the proverbial phantom
of the judiciary - a position which clearly weakens tribal sovereignty. It will
certainly empower all non-Indian parties who face claims in tribal courts
seeking removal. Prior to this decision a federal court in South Dakota
allowed removal when the defendant plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, then
remanded the contract dispute claims - clearly within the jurisdiction of the
tribal court - to the state court instead!" As tribal courts have evolved and
continue to evolve into effective systems of adjudicating a wide variety of
14. S1KWOOD (20th Century Fox 1983).
15. Kerr McGee Corp. v. Farley, 915 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D.N.M. 1995).
16. Lower Brule Constr. Co. v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co., 84 B.R. 638, 639-40
(D.S.D. 1988).
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claims they rely on recognition of their progress from the state and federal
judiciary to succeed. However, it is clear that even at the highest level of our
political system tribes must still struggle for recognition of their rights within
that system. The Neztsosie Court, as led by the Four Horsemen of the Indian
Law Apocalypse, 7 is a hostile forum in which those rights can be effectively
asserted. Here is a clear example of how "lawyers dwell on small details" 8
while neglecting the "weightier provisions of the law: justice and mercy and
faithfulness."'9 The solution at this point is that the tribes increase their
lobbying efforts on Congress and publicize their struggle through increased
exposure in the media. The Neztsosie decision can be addressed through
legislative action. It is only through such efforts that tribal existence and
needs will acknowledged and accommodated
But What If Superman Squeezed It into a Diamond?
In contrast to the broad reading of the Price-Anderson Act to include the
unstated, the Court returns to its hallowed strict textual analysis in Amoco
Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe." In this case, the Ute tribe
brought suit asserting ownership interests in coalbed methane gas (CBM)
contained in coal owned by the tribe.2' The tribe had acquired ownership of
these coal beds from the federal government. The government had reserved
these coal rights through the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 when it issued
limited land patents to homesteaders following an energy crisis.' The issue
in this case revolved around the meaning of the word "coal." Coalbed
methane gas is a byproduct of the process of mining coal, and as such was
considered a waste product until the 1970s. Most of CMB is absorbed on the
surface of the coal itself, though part of the gas is contained in water in the
coal and as a free gas.'
The Court centered its analysis on what Congress, in 1909, would have
understood the term "coal" to mean.' It also considered whether Congress
meant to only to preserve the solid fuel portion of coal.u In a complex
decision the Court held that coal was not an ambiguous term and that
Congress would not have understood the term coal broadly enough to
encompass CBM. Instead, the Court said that the gas was a separate mineral
17. Iustices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy.
18. DON HENLEY, The End of the Innocence, on THE END OF THE INNOCENCE (Geffen
Records 1989).
19. Matthew 23:23 (New American Standard).
20. 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1722.
23. Id. at 1724.





estate and noted that it would have needed to have been explicitly reserved
by the U.S. government in order for the CBM mineral rights to pass to the
Ute tribe.? Of course, this decision is an unfortunate result for the Ute tribe.
Although the tribe mines the coal, the CBM produced by their efforts may be
captured without the tribe receiving the economic benefit. Instead, the surface
landowners reap the economic benefit from the CBM. One could interpret the
holding of this case as giving the surface landowners the right to extract CBM
should the tribe decide not to mine the coal.' Whichever decision they
make, the economic outcome of Amoco Production is certainly problematic
and costly for the tribe.
The dissent in Amoco Production presents a logical and eloquent argument
that the landowner who, at one time, had the responsibility for disposing of
an unwanted waste product would accrue the benefit if that same waste
product were one day found to be of value.' Most notable, is the dissent's
reliance on "the canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor
of the sovereign."' That a substance which is an essential component of coal
and would not exist but for coal is not considered part of the coal is a
perplexing notion. What is even more baffling than this paradox of "what is
coal" is the contrast between the legal analysis Amoco Production and
Neztsosie. In Neztsosie non-existent terms are inferred to the detriment of
tribal jurisdiction, while in Amoco Production the term coal is construed in
the most meager fashion, to the detriment of the tribe. It makes one wonder
if the doctrine of construing ambiguous terms in favor of the plaintiff (or
sovereign) is altered if the party happens to be associated with an Indian tribe
in some way. Truly, the chill of winter has descended upon the tribes this
judicial season.
26. IL at 1726.
27. Id. at 1727.
28. Id. at 1728.
29. Id.
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